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Traditionally, interocular suppression is believed to disrupt high-level (i.e., semantic or
conceptual) processing of the suppressed visual input. The development of a new
experimental paradigm, breaking continuous ﬂash suppression (b-CFS), has caused a
resurgence of studies demonstrating high-level processing of visual information in the
absence of visual awareness. In this method the time it takes for interocularly suppressed
stimuli to breach the threshold of visibility, is regarded as ameasure of access to awareness.
The aim of the current review is twofold. First, we provide an overview of the literature using
this b-CFSmethod, whilemaking a distinction between two types of studies: those inwhich
suppression durations are compared between different stimulus classes (such as upright
faces versus inverted faces), and those in which suppression durations are compared for
stimuli that either match or mismatch concurrently available information (such as a colored
target that either matches or mismatches a color retained in working memory). Second,
we aim at dissociating high-level processing from low-level (i.e., crude visual) processing
of the suppressed stimuli. For this purpose, we include a thorough review of the control
conditions that are used in these experiments. Additionally, we provide recommendations
for proper control conditions that we deem crucial for disentangling high-level from low-
level effects. Based on this review, we argue that crude visual processing sufﬁces for
explaining differences in breakthrough times reported using b-CFS. As such, we conclude
that there is as yet no reason to assume that interocularly suppressed stimuli receive full
semantic analysis.
Keywords: continuous flash suppression, visual awareness, consciousness, binocular rivalry, interocular competi-
tion, interocular suppression
INTRODUCTION
INTEROCULAR COMPETITION
When different images are presented to both eyes, observers tend
to perceive only one of these images, whereas the other one does
not give rise to a conscious percept (e.g., binocular rivalry, Alais
and Blake, 2005; ﬂash suppression, Wolfe, 1984; continuous ﬂash
suppression, Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005). Under certain conditions
the suppressed image has the potency to affect behavior, but this
depends on the required level of processing (for a review see, Lin
and He, 2009). For instance, the potency of low-level image prop-
erties, such as spatial frequency (Blake and Fox, 1974; Blake et al.,
2006), motion direction (Wade and Wenderoth, 1978; O’Shea
and Crassini, 1981; Blake et al., 1999), color (White et al., 1978),
and orientation (Wade and Wenderoth, 1978) to elicit behavioral
adaptation effects is relatively unaffected by interocular suppres-
sion. Conceptual or semantic processing, however, is traditionally
believed to be abolished for interocularly suppressed stimuli (e.g.,
Zimba and Blake, 1983; Cave et al., 1998; Blake and Logothetis,
2002; Dehaene et al., 2006; Kang et al., 2011). In general, the
extent to which neural activity reﬂects interocularly suppressed
stimulation decreases gradually when climbing up the visual hier-
archy (Blake and Logothetis, 2002). For instance, most cells in
early visual areas (80% in V1/V2 and 60% in V4/V5) respond
to stimulation of either eye irrespective of the dominant percept
(Logothetis, 1998). Higher processing areas such as IT, FFA, and
PPA, however, follow mostly (although not exclusively; Fang and
He, 2005; Jiang and He, 2006; Sterzer et al., 2008) the dominant
percept (Tong et al., 1998). Thus, interocularly suppressed stimuli
are expected to be processed at the level of features and coarse
feature conﬁgurations, which we will refer to as the lower or
visual processing level, but not at a semantic or conceptual level
(Blake and Logothetis, 2002), which we will refer to as higher
level.
In contrast to this traditional view, studies using a novel
paradigm called breaking continuous ﬂash suppression (b-CFS;
Jiang et al., 2007) seem to demonstrate that high-level processing
of interocularly suppressed stimuli can occur prior to conscious
experience. In the present article we aim to demonstrate that
the seemingly high-level effects obtained in these b-CFS studies
can be accounted for by coarse visual processing of the stim-
uli under continuous ﬂash suppression (CFS). For this purpose,
we provide a complete overview of all studies up to date (30)
using b-CFS. Additionally, we suggest a number of improve-
ments to the b-CFS method that help dissociate competition
at relatively high levels of processing (i.e., at a conceptual or
semantic level) from competition at lower levels of process-
ing (i.e., at a featural level, where color, orientation, etc. are
processed).
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BREAKING CONTINUOUS FLASH SUPPRESSION
In the b-CFS paradigm, a high contrast dynamic pattern mask is
presented to one eye, thereby effectively suppressing a stimulus
of increasing intensity presented to the other eye. Eventually, the
ocular dominance will reverse, such that the previously suppressed
stimulus becomes visible. The time it takes for observers to detect
the suppressed stimulus is assumed to reﬂect the moment in time
at which the stimulus gains access to consciousness. Importantly,
non-ocular factors can affect the moment at which interocularly
suppressed stimuli become consciously observable (Blake, 2001;
Paffen and Alais, 2011). In light of the b-CFS paradigm, we dis-
sociate two factors that co-determine the timing of an ocular
dominance reversal. First, some stimulus classes might inher-
ently breach the threshold of visibility faster than other stimulus
classes (e.g., upright versus inverted faces; Jiang et al., 2007). Sec-
ond, suppression durations can systematically differ for stimuli
that either match or mismatch consciously accessible information
(e.g., prime-target congruency; Costello et al., 2009). In review-
ing the b-CFS literature we propose to take into account these
two distinct ways in which non-ocular factors impinge upon the
selection for conscious access: manipulations of the content of
the suppressed stimulus, and manipulations of the context within
which the suppressed stimulus is presented. As both types of
experiments have their own advantages and limitations in uncov-
ering the nature of preconscious processes, they are discussed
separately.
EFFECTS OF STIMULUS CONTEXT
PRIMING
The ﬁrst part of this review comprises an overview of b-CFS
studies in which the detection time of identical stimuli is com-
pared between different experimental conditions. These studies
show that the same visual input can result in different suppres-
sion durations depending on the (consciously accessible) context
that is provided. One widely studied way to affect the context
within which information is presented is priming. This method
involves presenting a stimulus prior to the b-CFS task, which
is either related or unrelated to the masked target stimulus.
Costello et al. (2009) showed that written words (e.g., “ﬁre”)
break through suppression faster when they are preceded by a
word that shares sub-word components (e.g., “tire”) than when
they are preceded by a word that does not share sub-word com-
ponents. Costello et al. (2009) also showed that words break
through suppression faster when they are preceded by a seman-
tically related word (e.g., “burn”) than when they are preceded
by an unrelated word. Lupyan and Ward (2013) took this one
step further by showing that this priming effect also occurs
when prime and target are presented in different modalities;
for instance, an image of a pumpkin broke through suppres-
sion faster after observers heard the word “pumpkin” than after
hearing a word that did not match with the subsequent tar-
get. Yang and Yeh (2014) presented words under CFS, of which
the onset was either accompanied by an audible white noise
burst or not. Detection times were shortened by the concur-
rent presentation of noise bursts, but only when the audio
and visual information originated from the same depth plane.
Together, these priming studies reveal that visual input that
matches previously perceived information breaks through sup-
pression faster than visual input thatmismatches this information.
Importantly, the prime-target relation can be spatial, physical, or
semantic in nature, and does not require presentation in the same
modality.
THE CONTENT OF VISUAL WORKING MEMORY
Similarly to priming, the content of visual working memory is also
known to affect visual processing, such that stimuli matching this
content receive privileged processing compared to non-matching
information (e.g., in search tasks, Olivers et al., 2006). One major
difference between these two methods is that visual working
memory involves the active, rather than passive maintenance
(i.e., rehearsal) of visual features. In experiments that manip-
ulate the content of visual working memory, participants are
instructed to retain some feature of a visual stimulus for sub-
sequent recollection. During the retention phase, participants
perform a b-CFS task in which interocularly suppressed targets
either match or mismatch the information that is concurrently
retained in working memory. Recently, it has been shown that
target stimuli under CFS are detected faster when they match
rather than mismatch a color category (Gayet et al., 2013), an
orientation (Liu et al., 2013) or a face (Pan et al., 2013) that
is actively held in visual working memory. Crucially, detection
times remain unaffected when the stimuli, otherwise used for
the memory task, are passively viewed, as opposed to actively
retained in working memory. In contrast with the priming studies
discussed previously, Gayet et al. (2013) demonstrated that priv-
ileged detection of matching stimuli was only observed when
the relevant stimulus dimension was retained; when partici-
pants retained the shape of a stimulus, targets that matched the
color of that stimulus were not prioritized for conscious detec-
tion. Together, these working memory studies show that visual
input that matches concurrently retained, task relevant infor-
mation is accessible to consciousness faster than non-matching
information.
SIMULTANEOUS CROSS MODAL PRIMING
Three recent studies used a methodological approach in which
the manipulation of the context was longer lasting than that of
priming studies, without involving the active retention of infor-
mation as in the working memory studies. In these experiments,
consciously accessible, non-visual information was concurrently
presented with a b-CFS task. First, Zhou et al. (2010) demon-
strated that images matching olfactory information (e.g., an image
of a rose concurrently presented with the scent of a rose) break
through suppression faster than images mismatching olfactory
information (e.g., an image of a rose concurrently presented
with the scent of butanol). Second, Alsius and Munhall (2013)
showed that an interocularly suppressed talking face stimulus
broke through suppression faster when an auditory sentence
matched rather than mismatched the lip synchronization of the
face. Finally, Salomon et al. (2013) showed an effect of pro-
prioception on visual awareness. In their study, participants
reported the orientation of an interocularly suppressed target,
which was superimposed on a task-irrelevant image of a hand.
This hand could either be congruent or incongruent with the
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participants’ actual position. Targets broke through interocular
suppression faster when the image of the hand matched the posi-
tion of the real hand. The authors conclude that proprioception
modulates the selection for conscious access of visual stimuli.
Taken together, these studies show an advantage for detecting
stimuli that match rather than mismatch consciously accessible
information.
VISUAL VERSUS CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF SUPPRESSED STIMULI
The major advantage of all b-CFS experiments described in
Sections “Priming to Simultaneous Cross Modal Priming is that
differences in suppression durations cannot be accounted for by
differences in image characteristics between conditions. This fol-
lows from the fact that in all conditions the same stimuli are
used as target stimuli under CFS. The differentiation between
conditions stems purely from the relation between target stimuli
and the consciously accessible context in which they are embed-
ded. Arguably, this context biases the competition by boosting
or diminishing the effective strength of the suppressed stimuli
(for a similar interpretation for attention’s effect on interocu-
lar suppression, see Paffen and Alais, 2011). The authors of the
papers described above generally interpret their ﬁndings in terms
of pre-activation of prime related information (either semantic or
physical), which biases subsequent interocular competition (e.g.,
Lupyan and Ward, 2013). In this view, prime induced activity in
areas further up the processing hierarchy (e.g., object selective
areas) feeds back to the earlier visual cortex where the interocular
competition is resolved (e.g., Blake, 1989; Tong, 2001). Note, how-
ever, that this interpretation cannot provide a satisfactory account
for the semantic priming effect of Costello et al. (2009), which
requires semantic analysis of the prime as well as the suppressed
target. This issue is further discussed in Section “Assessing the
Level of Processing.”
The assumption that competition occurred at the level of sim-
ple stimulus features rather than at the semantic or conceptual level
was explicitly tested by Lupyan andWard (2013) in a second exper-
iment. Here, participants were cued with either the word “square”
or “circle,” before performing a b-CFS task. By using a wide range
of stimulus shapes ranging on a continuum from square to cir-
cle, they found that the similarity between the target stimulus and
the cued shape was negatively correlated with the detection time
of the target stimulus. The authors conclude from this ﬁnding
that upon hearing (or reading) a word, a visual representation of
its content is automatically activated. This active representation
then facilitates subsequent detection of matching visual input. As
such, the effects of semantic primes on suppression durations of
subsequently presented targets are visual, rather than semantic in
nature. The major advantage of this interpretation is that it allows
for semantic priming, in the absence of semantic analysis of the
suppressed stimulus.
Further support for this idea of feature pre-activation comes
from the working memory experiments described above. When
observers actively retain stimulus features, such as an orienta-
tion, these features can be decoded from activity in the early
visual cortex (Harrison and Tong, 2009; Serences et al., 2009;
Christophel et al., 2012). Thus, the abovementioned working
memory studies allow for comparing between the situation in
which prime-induced activity is retained and conditions in which
prime-induced activity is discarded. The absence of an effect of
the prime on suppression durations when the prime is perceived
but not actively retained suggests that the prime-target congru-
ency effects are indeed caused by pre-activation of prime induced
features.
Together, the ﬁndings in this chapter show that providing a
consciously accessible context prioritizes visual information that
matches this context. As argued earlier, the consciously accessible
context might activate a visual representation, which then inter-
acts with the interocularly suppressed target. As such, even if the
relation between the context and the suppressed target is semantic
in nature, semantic analysis of the target is not necessary for detec-
tion times to be affected. One of the drawbacks of this type of
b-CFS experiment is, however, that it does not allow for unequiv-
ocally excluding the possibility that the interocularly suppressed
stimulus is processed up to a semantic level. In contrast, when
comparing the potency of different stimulus classes in reaching
visual awareness without providing a context, any difference in
detection times between conditions (either featural or semantic
in nature) reﬂects differences in the processing of the suppressed
stimulus itself, rather than its interaction with a previously altered
neural state. Studies using this approach will be discussed in the
following paragraphs.
EFFECTS OF STIMULUS CONTENT
VISUAL CHARACTERISTICS
The second type of b-CFS experiments compares detection times
between different stimulus categories. This comprises the com-
parison of stimulus categories that differ on the basis of relatively
low-level visual properties that can be resolved in the early
visual cortex, which will be discussed in this ﬁrst section. For
these stimulus properties, there is a tendency that more con-
spicuous stimuli are harder to suppress by CFS and, as such,
break through suppression faster than less conspicuous stimuli.
For instance, both higher contrast stimuli (Tsuchiya and Koch,
2005) and higher spatial frequency stimuli break through CFS
more readily (Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005; Yang and Blake, 2012).
Also, certain topological properties of interocularly suppressed
stimuli elicit faster detection times than others. For instance,
suppressed stimuli with a hole are detected faster than open
stimuli made up of the same structural elements (Meng et al.,
2012). When identical stimuli follow different motion patterns,
this may result in different detection thresholds as well. For
instance, coherently moving dot arrays break through suppres-
sion more often than random dot arrays that are presented for
the same duration (Kaunitz et al., 2013). Climbing further up
the visual hierarchy, images with strong grouping cues, such as
Kanisza triangles are detected faster than non-Kanisza’s made
up of the same constituents (Wang et al., 2012). Together, these
studies show that different stimuli yield different suppression
durations, and that this effect might be linked to the saliency of
the suppressed stimulus. This is in line with ﬁndings from binoc-
ular rivalry experiments, which demonstrate that the location at
which a perceptual transition is initiated depends on the local
saliency of the suppressed stimulus (Paffen et al., 2008; Stuit et al.,
2010).
www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 460 | 3
Gayet et al. Interocular competition at a pre-semantic processing level
Differences in suppression durations between stimulus cate-
gories can be accounted for both by properties of the suppressed
stimuli per se, and by interactions between properties of the stim-
uli and properties of the masks (for a discussion, see Stein et al.,
2011a).Wedissociate two types of interactions between the stimuli
and the masks that can potentially affect suppression durations.
First, increased differences between visual characteristics of the
suppressed image and the CFS stimuli reduce the suppression
strength. For instance, Yang and Blake (2012) showed that stim-
uli with oblique orientations broke through suppression faster
than stimuli with cardinal orientations, when using traditional
“Mondrians” as CFS stimulus (which contain only cardinal orien-
tations). More speciﬁcally, greater similarity in spatial frequency
content and orientation between the competing percepts led to
stronger suppression in both b-CFS (Yang and Blake, 2012) and
binocular rivalry (Stuit et al., 2011). Second, when the previously
suppressed image (or a sub-part of it) breaks through suppres-
sion, detection is facilitated if the suppressed image and the masks
are very different. As discerning a suppressed stimulus through
a mask requires exceeding some threshold of certainty, stimuli
with more “proof”of being a potential target have an advantage in
breaking CFS (for similar interpretations, see Kaunitz et al., 2013
and Yang and Yeh, 2014). Such a bias could be underpinned by
the phenomenon of piecemeal rivalry, which allows for perceiv-
ing local parts of the “suppressed” stimulus (Blake et al., 1992;
O’Shea et al., 1997). Since the dominant percept is highly dynamic
(i.e., the CFS masks), locally dominant stimulus parts from the
non-dominant eye (in which the target is presented) are easily
confused with the CFS masks, and thus disregarded. However,
when piecemeal rivalry reveals stimulus parts that seem coher-
ently related (e.g., they follow a particular pattern or movement
direction), these stimulus parts may attract attention, as they are
likely to be the target (e.g., collinear facilitation; Wilson et al.,
2001). This may affect suppression durations, since attending to
a stimulus in a speciﬁc eye enhances the competition strength of
the entire ipsi-ocular stimulus (Ooi and He, 1999; Zhang et al.,
2012).
Nonetheless, differences between aforementioned conditions
do not necessitate non-conscious semantic or conceptual process-
ing, but are based on the differentiation of stimulus properties
that are generally assumed to survive interocular suppression
(for reviews, see Blake and Logothetis, 2002; Lin and He, 2009;
Faivre et al., 2014; Sterzer et al., 2014). In the next sections, a
number of studies will be discussed in which suppression dura-
tions are affected on the basis of higher level stimulus properties
(i.e., at a semantic or conceptual level). Please note that the
“familiarity” and “ecological relevance” distinction, as provided
below, aims at categorizing these studies based on topical sim-
ilarities, rather than describing the mechanisms that drive their
results.
FAMILIARITY
Differences in detection times between stimulus categories can
also arise on the basis of more high-level distinctions, such as
stimulus familiarity. For instance, images of human bodies or
body parts are detected faster when presented upright as com-
pared to inverted (Stein et al., 2012). As the authors demonstrate
that this latter effect was abolished when the images were dis-
torted, the authors argue that the difference in detection times
is accounted for by the greater familiarity of upright human
bodies. Along the same lines, upright faces are detected faster
than inverted faces (Jiang et al., 2007; Zhou et al., 2010; Stein
et al., 2011a,b; Gray et al., 2013). Two of these studies (Stein
et al., 2011b; Gray et al., 2013) also included a polarity inver-
sion condition, demonstrating that detection times were fastest
for normal faces (upright and normal polarity) and slowest for
the most unusual face presentation condition (spatial inversion
and inversed polarity), although the inversion effect was only
marginally signiﬁcant in the inversed polarity condition of Stein
et al. (2011b). The ﬁnding that face inversion effects are dependent
on (or additive to)manipulations of the contrast polarity, supports
the idea that it is indeed familiarity that drives the priority for
detecting upright faces. Importantly, however, Stein et al. (2011b)
replicated these ﬁndings with conﬁgurations of three blobs repre-
senting two eyes and amouth. This demonstrates that the privilege
for detecting upright faces can be resolved by very crude visual
processing.
Gobbini et al. (2013b) took the manipulation of stimulus
familiarity even further by showing that interocularly suppressed
familiar faces are detected faster than faces of strangers. A
more subtle ﬁnding comes from a study showing that faces
from the own racial in-group break through suppression faster
than faces from the racial out-group (Stein, 2012). That same
study showed that faces of the same age group as that of the
observer break through suppression faster than faces of another
age group. Importantly, the differences in suppression dura-
tions between image conditions were computed relative to that
of inverted faces, such that they could not be attributed to
differences in low-level image properties (see Control 1: Dis-
rupting the Extraction of Meaning). Rather, the authors suggest
that this effect is accounted for by the observer’s greater visual
expertise with stimuli of the own-race and own-age stimulus
classes.
This facilitatory effect for detecting visual input of higher famil-
iarity is also found for stimuli that are more recently acquired in
evolutionary time, such as written language. Indeed, words in a
familiar alphabet are detected faster than words in an alphabet that
is unfamiliar to the observer (Jiang et al., 2007). Similarly, Chinese
characters are detected faster by Chinese readers compared to the
same characters that have been inversed or scrambled (Yang and
Yeh, 2011, 2014). Taken together, these studies show that visual
input with higher stimulus familiarity is more readily detected
than less familiar input. Arguably, extended experience with cer-
tain types of stimuli might facilitate subsequent detection. If so,
the factor of familiarity might be the long term equivalent of the
stimulus feature pre-activation as described in Section “Effects of
Stimulus Context.”
ECOLOGICAL RELEVANCE
A number of studies demonstrate differences in detection times
for stimuli that differ on the basis of ecological relevance. For
instance, observers show an advantage for detecting faces turned
toward the observer compared to faces turned slightly away from
the observer (Gobbini et al., 2013a). This difference was found
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to be independent of the gaze direction of the face. Similarly,
faces with direct gaze break through interocular suppression faster
than faces with averted gaze. This was found both for schematic
faces (Chen and Yeh, 2012) and for face photographs (Stein et al.,
2011c). This advantage for detecting faces with direct gaze could
not be explained by (lower-level) effects of eye symmetry, as Stein
et al. (2011c) included images of both frontal faces and laterally
averted faces, such that gaze direction should be inferred by the
particular combination of both face orientation and pupil posi-
tion. However, the advantage in detecting stimuli with direct gaze
over averted gaze persisted for inverted faces (Stein et al., 2011c;
Chen andYeh, 2012). Gaze direction in (visible) faces is more difﬁ-
cultly inferred from inverted faces compared to upright faces (e.g.,
Vecera and Johnson, 1995). Thus, the effect of gaze direction on
detection times should be less prominent in the inverted condi-
tion than in the upright condition. The absence of this interaction
between gaze direction and face inversion therefore hints toward
the interpretation that crude conﬁgural differences between gaze
conditions might play a causal role in eliciting these differences
in detection times. For instance, Chen and Yeh (2012) propose
that the speciﬁc conjunction of face curvature and pupil loca-
tion is sufﬁcient in eliciting shorter suppression durations. In line
with this idea, they demonstrated in an additional experiment that
the mere schematic depiction of eyes was sufﬁcient in explain-
ing the observed difference in detection times of full (schematic)
faces.
Another ecologically potentially relevant distinction between
stimulus categories is that of emotional versus non-emotional
stimuli. For instance, fearful faces break through suppression faster
than neutral faces (Yang et al., 2007; Gray et al., 2013; Stein et al.,
2014) or happy faces (Yang et al., 2007; Tsuchiya et al., 2009; Gray
et al., 2013), while happy (Yang et al., 2007) and angry faces (Gray
et al., 2013) break through suppression slower than neutral faces.
Interestingly, both types of emotional expressions break through
suppression faster than neutral faces when schematic face images
are used instead of face photographs (Stein and Sterzer, 2012).
This contradiction suggests that it is not the analysis of the emo-
tional valence per se, but rather the visual properties of the image
that affected suppression durations in these studies. In line with
this lower level account, the ﬁndings of Gray et al. (2013) per-
sisted for inverted faces and for faces with inversed polarity, while
the ﬁndings of Yang et al. (2007) persisted for inverted faces and
for eyes-only images. Similarly, the ﬁndings of Stein and Sterzer
(2012) were fully accounted for by the relative orientation of the
mouth curvature and the face contour. Finally, the ﬁndings of Stein
et al. (2014) depended solely on high spatial frequency informa-
tion. Since subcortical (i.e., amygdala) processing of fearful faces
relies predominantly on low spatial frequency information (e.g.,
LeDoux, 1998), this ﬁnding suggests that non-conscious process-
ing of fearful faces is dependent on cortical processing. Patient
SM, who has complete bilateral amygdala lesions and is unable to
consciously discriminate between fearful and happy faces, showed
the same advantages for detecting CFS-suppressed fearful faces
over happy faces as controls did (Tsuchiya et al., 2009). As such,
non-conscious discrimination between emotional faces seems to
rely more on (cortical) extraction of characteristic visual features,
than on the (subcortical) analysis of the emotional valence per
se. Taken together, these studies show a tendency for ecologi-
cally relevant stimuli to break through interocular suppression
faster than less ecologically relevant stimuli. However, most of
these effects have been shown to rely on stimulus properties, or
stimulus conﬁgurations, that can be dissociated on the basis of
relatively crude visual processing. In sum, semantic, conceptual
or emotional analysis of interocularly suppressed stimuli is not
a necessary condition to account for the observed differences in
detection times. Rather, the extraction of purely visual informa-
tion seems to sufﬁcient to explain most of the ﬁndings discussed
so far.
CLIMBING TOWARD THE SEMANTIC AND CONCEPTUAL LEVEL
As with the privilege for detecting familiar stimuli, the privilege
for detecting emotional stimuli was not restricted to evolution-
arily old visual input, such as faces, but was also demonstrated
for words (Yang and Yeh, 2011). Interestingly, the results of this
study revealed that both (Chinese) words that describe a nega-
tive emotion (e.g., “anger” or “fear”) and words that induce a
negative emotion (e.g., “murder” or “abuse”) were detected later
than neutral words. Taking this idea even further, Sklar et al.
(2012) compared suppression durations of emotionally nega-
tive expressions to suppression durations of neutral expressions.
Importantly, the words that formed these expressions had no
intrinsic emotional valence (e.g., “eternal” and “rest”; “eternal
rest”). Nonetheless, the expressions with a negative emotional
valence broke through suppression faster than neutral expres-
sions. Interestingly, these results are at odds with that of Yang
and Yeh (2011). Still, both studies demonstrate effects that require
semantic processing of the words before interocular competition
is resolved.
Sklar et al. (2012) also demonstrated that combinations of
(Hebrew) words that yield incoherent expressions (e.g., “she
ironed coffee”) broke through suppression faster than coherent
expressions (e.g., “she drank coffee”). Again, it is the semantic
combination of words that determines whether an expression is
coherent or incoherent, rather than the individual words them-
selves. This ﬁnding demonstrates that the meaning of words is
indeed extracted and integrated non-consciously. Along the same
lines, Mudrik et al. (2011) showed that scenes containing incon-
gruent objects (e.g., Michael Jordan holding a watermelon) broke
through suppression faster than the same scenes containing con-
gruent objects (e.g., Michael Jordan holding a basketball). The
authors stress that dissociating a coherent from an incoherent
image requires the integration of an object in its semantic con-
text; a process originally thought to require consciousness (e.g.,
Edelman andTononi, 2000). In contrast with the familiarity effects
discussed in Section“Familiarity,” the stimuli used in these last two
experiments seem too complex for the differences in suppression
durations to be accounted for by differences in visual experience
between stimulus conditions. As such, these results imply full
blown semantic analysis of interocularly suppressed stimuli.
DISCUSSION
ASSESSING THE LEVEL OF PROCESSING
Most ﬁndings in Section “Priming” up to Section “Ecological Rel-
evance” can be explained by preconscious analysis of suppressed
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stimuli at relatively early stages of visual processing. Whether they
are caused by pre-activation of primed features, by the saliency
of a stimulus, or by the long time strengthening of visual rep-
resentations of relevant feature conﬁgurations, these ﬁndings
do not seem to require semantic or conceptual processing. In
contrast, the ﬁndings discussed in the last section (see Climb-
ing Towards the Semantic and Conceptual Level) as well as the
semantic priming effect of Costello et al. (2009) seem to defy the
model of early competition in interocular suppression and point
to high-level analysis of the suppressed stimuli. There are, how-
ever, two reasons to plead for caution in interpreting the studies
that demonstrate these high-level effects (e.g., language and scene
comprehension). First, some of the results described above seem
contradictory, such as the results of Sklar et al. (2012) in which
negative emotional expressions yielded shorter suppression dura-
tions compared to the results of Yang and Yeh (2011) in which
negative emotional words yielded longer suppression durations.
In a broader sense, the overall pattern of ﬁndings of these high-
level effects (see Climbing Towards the Semantic and Conceptual
Level) seems inconsistent with the pattern of ﬁndings from lower
level effects (Sections Priming – Ecological Relevance). On the one
hand, words and images break through suppression faster when
they have a higher prevalence in the observers’ visual world (i.e.,
when they are of higher familiarity). On the other hand, however,
word combinations and complex scenes break through suppres-
sion faster when they are incongruent or novel, and thus are of
lower familiarity. While it is conceivable that scene complexity
inﬂuences the magnitude of the effect of familiarity on suppres-
sion durations, it is unexpected that scene complexity causes a
reversal in the direction of the effect of familiarity on suppression
durations.
Second, to demonstrate that differences in suppression dura-
tions are caused by competition at a high processing level (i.e.,
semantic or conceptual), it is important to implement a compar-
ison with a condition that disrupts high-level processing, such
as inversion (e.g., as used in the Sterzer lab), polarity inver-
sion or scrambling. If the difference in suppression durations
observed under normal presentation conditions is also appar-
ent in these conditions, it is likely that the effect is caused by
differences in lower level visual properties between the stimulus
classes (see Control 1: Disrupting the Extraction of Meaning).
Four out of ﬁve studies that do include this type of control
conditions to dissociate between competition at higher process-
ing levels from competition at lower (visual) processing levels,
demonstrated that the effect could indeed be attributed to com-
petition at lower levels of the processing hierarchy (Stein et al.,
2011b; Stein and Sterzer, 2012; Chen and Yeh, 2012; Gray et al.,
2013). Consequently, these studies do not attribute their ﬁnd-
ings to high level processing under continuous ﬂash suppression.
Importantly, three out of four b-CFS experiments that led the
authors to conclude from their data that the observed difference
in suppression durations was caused by semantic or concep-
tual analysis of the stimuli under CFS, however, did not include
such a control condition (i.e., Costello et al., 2009; Mudrik et al.,
2011; Sklar et al., 2012). Thus far, the only study that convinc-
ingly demonstrates high-level competition in a b-CFS experiment,
is that of Yang and Yeh (2011). In this study, the authors
included an inversion condition, a scrambled condition as well
as a monocular condition. This revealed that the shorter suppres-
sion durations for neutral Chinese words compared to emotional
Chinese words was only apparent in the upright unscrambled
dichoptic condition.
In sum,more andmore studies (discussed inClimbing Towards
The Semantic and Conceptual Level) aim at demonstrating that
semantic and conceptual information might be integrated non-
consciously. However, this is hard to reconcile with studies
showing that semantic priming effects are abolished under inte-
rocular suppression (e.g., Zimba and Blake, 1983; Cave et al., 1998;
Kang et al., 2011; for reviews, see Lin and He, 2009; Faivre et al.,
2014; Sterzer et al., 2014). In some studies interocular suppres-
sion is even used as a tool to disrupt semantic processing (e.g.,
Lupyan and Ward, 2013). These high-level effects are also hard
to reconcile with the idea that interocular competition is resolved
in early visual areas such as LGN (Haynes et al., 2005) and V1
(Polonsky et al., 2000). Although some interocularly suppressed
information is known to transpire into higher visual areas (e.g.,
Fang and He, 2005; Jiang and He, 2006; Sterzer et al., 2008),
succeeding levels in the processing hierarchy reveal less and less
brain activity that reﬂects interocularly suppressed stimulation
(Blake and Logothetis, 2002). Moreover, CFS is known to result
in greater suppression depths than more traditional methods of
interocular suppression, such as ﬂash suppression and binoc-
ular rivalry (Tsuchiya et al., 2006). Consequently, when b-CFS
is used to compare different classes of stimuli in their potency
to breach the threshold of awareness, it is of utmost impor-
tance to test whether reaction times indeed reﬂect differences
in high-level rather than low-level information in the stimuli.
Additionally, irrespective of the processing level at which the
competition takes place, it is crucial to assert whether reac-
tion times indeed reﬂect differences in the timing at which a
stimuluswas available to consciousness, rather than processes aris-
ing after the stimulus became available to consciousness. These
post-perceptual effects pose a threat to b-CFS experiments in
which the stimulus content is manipulated as well as to experi-
ments in which the stimulus context is manipulated. We propose
that at least the following three control conditions should be
included in b-CFS experiments to control for these potential
pitfalls.
CONTROL 1: DISRUPTING THE EXTRACTION OF MEANING
To assess whether differences between conditions rely on high-
level information (i.e., at a semantic or conceptual level), one
or more conditions should be included that are known to dis-
rupt the extraction of high-level image properties, while keeping
low-level (i.e., visual) image properties relatively unaffected. This
can be achieved by such manipulations as inverting the image or
inverting the image polarity (e.g., Jiang et al., 2007; Zhou et al.,
2010; Stein et al., 2011b; Chen and Yeh, 2012; Gray et al., 2013).
These manipulations constrain the extraction of meaning from an
image (Rock, 1974; Shore and Klein, 2000), such that high-level
driven effects should at least diminish under these circumstances.
As such, if some image class breaks through suppression faster
than another stimulus class because of high-level (i.e., seman-
tic or conceptual) differences, the differences in detection times
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between these two stimulus classes should not be observed (or
at least diminish) when the images are presented upside down.
Conversely, if the difference in detection times between two stim-
ulus classes does persist with inverted presentation, this suggests
that there are systematic low-level visual differences between the
two image classes, as these should remain unaffected by inverted
presentation. In that case, the differences in low-level visual prop-
erties are the probable cause of the difference in detection times
between the two stimulus classes. For this reason, rather than
looking at absolute detection times for each stimulus category,
it is more informative to look at the inversion effect, which is
described as the difference in detection times between upright
and inverted stimuli of the same stimulus category. This dif-
ference can then be divided by the detection time of inverted
stimuli (as in Stein, 2012) such as to remove the between subject
variability in detection times. Consequently, to assess whether a
difference between image classes relies on high-level stimulus pro-
cessing, it is important to demonstrate that the inversion effects
(rather than the detection times per se) differ between stimulus
classes.
CONTROL 2: STIMULUS REPORTABILITY
Next, it is important to verify whether differences in reaction times
indeed reﬂect differences in visual awareness. An alternative view
is that differences in reaction times are driven by non-conscious
processes, such that stimulus information is accessible only to the
extent that it affects forced choice localization, while not being
accessible to subjective report. Arguably, a stimulus fails to reach
visual awareness, if it is accessible to one output system, but not
to the other (Baars, 1993; Kanwisher, 2001). Thus, in order to
conclude that some manipulation in a b-CFS experiment affects
visual awareness, visual awareness should be measured directly.
Visual awareness of a stimulus is assumed to be a prerequisite for
stimulus reportability (Dehaene et al., 2006). As such, it can be
operationalized as the ability to subjectively report ones percept
(Dennett, 1993; Weiskrantz, 1997; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001).
For the present purpose, a direct way to test whether one stim-
ulus was accessible to consciousness and the other was not, is to
compare participants’ ability to report the identity of two concur-
rent stimuli at a particular point in time. This objective measure
of stimulus reportability can be implemented by presenting two
stimuli of different conditions simultaneously (e.g., one at either
side of ﬁxation). After participants perform a speeded detection
of the location at which (e.g., left or right of ﬁxation) they ﬁrst
see a stimulus appear, they should report either the identity of the
percept on the reported location, or of that on the non-reported
location. If no post-detection strategic bias is involved, partici-
pants should be signiﬁcantly worse at reporting the identity of the
stimulus on the non-reported location as compared to that of the
reported location. Conversely, if participants are equally proﬁcient
at reporting the identity of either stimulus, one may not conclude
that there was a difference in conscious access between stimulus
conditions.
CONTROL 3: POST DETECTION EFFECTS
Finally, it is important to assess whether differences in detec-
tion times indeed reﬂect differences in interocular suppression
durations, rather than processing differences arising after con-
scious detection of the stimulus (e.g., a difference in response
criterion). To account for these “late” effects it is imperative to
add a monocular (or binocular) control condition, in which the
“suppressed” stimulus and the CFS are presented to the same
eye(s). Speciﬁcally, we advocate the use of two different monocu-
lar control conditions (as in, Costello et al., 2009; and Gayet et al.,
2013). First, a monocular control condition is needed in which
the presentation times are identical to that of the interocular con-
dition, such as to keep the stimulus chronology constant (i.e., a
physically similar control). The disadvantage of this condition is,
however, that reaction times in this condition are much faster than
in the interocular condition. Consequently, any differences in reac-
tion times between conditions are reduced in magnitude as well,
as a result of which the experimental power can be diminished
(although the variance is reduced as well). Thus, it is impera-
tive to implement a second monocular condition such, that the
reaction time distributions (means and SD’s) match that of the
interocular condition (for further discussion on this issue, see
Stein et al., 2011a). This can be achieved by (1) lengthening the
ramp of the “suppressed” stimulus, such as to mimic the longer
suppression durations of trials with dichoptic presentation, and,
(2) by jittering the target onset, such as to add uncertainty as
to when the target will appear (i.e., a perceptually similar con-
trol). Ideally, interocular trials and monocular control trials are
randomly intermixed within blocks. This has the main advan-
tage of making the perceptual difference between dichoptic and
monocular (or binocular) presentation conditions less conspic-
uous, due to the whimsical nature of dichoptically presented
trials.
Together, these three methods provide empirical tests for (1)
whether differences between stimulus conditions actually rely on
high-level information, (2) whether differences in reaction times
indeed reﬂect differences in explicit visual awareness, and (3)
whether reaction times were affected by processing differences
emerging after conscious detection, such as changes in response
criterion.
INTERPRETING THE RESULTS OF b-CFS STUDIES
As mentioned in the introduction, the rationale underlying b-CFS
experiments is that differences in suppression durations between
conditions reﬂect different processing of stimuli prior to con-
scious access. An often disregarded alternative, however, is that
differences between conditions may affect visual processing dur-
ing the transitory period in which the interocularly suppressed
stimuli gradually gain access to consciousness. In support of this
latter idea, CFS allows for periods of partial awareness, in which
some, but not all, features of a stimulus are suppressed (Zad-
bood et al., 2011; Yang and Blake, 2012). Crucially, Mudrik et al.
(2013) demonstrated that “non-conscious” processing of faces
was restricted to periods of partial awareness. This ﬁnding has
two consequences for b-CFS studies: First, it indicates that detec-
tion tasks are better suited than discrimination tasks to ascertain
that differences in detection times between conditions are initi-
ated prior to a switch in ocular dominance. For instance, if the
crucial manipulation involves one feature of some stimulus (e.g.,
color) and participants are required to report another feature of
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that stimulus (e.g., orientation) for the b-CFS task, it is con-
ceivable that the color of that same stimulus was accessible to
consciousness prior to its orientation. As a result, the possibil-
ity cannot be excluded that the process driving the differences in
detection times between color conditions arose after the interoc-
ular competition (of that particular feature) was resolved, thereby
reﬂecting a conscious rather than non-conscious process. Second,
and more importantly, if the main goal of the experimenter is
to uncover the nature of non-conscious processing, the concur-
rent usage of multiple suppression techniques is advisable, with
an emphasis on the more traditional methods that have been
ostensibly validated (Stein and Sterzer, 2014) and are less sus-
ceptible to partial awareness (Mudrik et al., 2013). As suggested
above, b-CFS possibly relies on processing differences during the
transitory period, in which previously suppressed stimuli gain
gradual access to consciousness. As such, it is hard to ascertain
whether differences in stimulus processing during a transition of
ocular dominance can generalize to differences in stimulus pro-
cessing in the complete absence of consciousness. Despite being
not as well suited as a tool to uncover non-conscious processing
per se, b-CFS experiments are nonetheless very informative as a
measure of access to awareness (Stein and Sterzer, 2014). Conse-
quently, the results of b-CFS experiments should be interpreted as
such.
With the above mentioned additions to the b-CFS paradigm,
we hope to provide the means to effectively dissociate situations
in which competition for conscious access occurs on high-level
battle grounds and thus requires conceptual or semantic process-
ing, from situations inwhich the competition occurs on lower level
battle grounds, such that crude visual processing of the suppressed
stimuli sufﬁces. In light of the abovementioned limitations, it
should be emphasized that whether or not high-level stimulus
properties exert inﬂuence on conscious access within the b-CFS
paradigm does not necessarily imply that the same restrictions
apply to non-conscious processing under CFS, let alone to inte-
rocular suppression in general. Thus far, however, the idea that
interocularly suppressed stimuli are not analyzed up to semantic or
conceptual processing levels has been mainly challenged by b-CFS
experiments. The present review included 30 studies that use this
experimental paradigm, of which 8 aimed to explore whether sup-
pression durations could be affected by competition at a semantic
or conceptual processing stage. Four of these studies demonstrate
that these effects could be accounted for by differences in low-level
visual properties, three of these studies did not include conditions
that controls for differences in low-level visual properties, and as
a result, only one study demonstrates high-level effects in a b-CFS
task. As such, we conclude that interocular competition at a visual
level is a sufﬁcient explanation for most b-CFS studies that prop-
erly control for low-level visual differences (i.e., that include an
inversion condition). As such, we should be reluctant to revise the
traditional idea that semantic or conceptual analysis is abolished
under interocular suppression.
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